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Alfred  Broaddus 
On  May  1,  1978,  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  amended  its  Regulation  Q 
to  allow  member  banks  to  transfer  funds  from  a 
customer’s  savings  account  to  his  checking  account 
automatically  under  certain  stipulated  conditions.1 
Such  transfers  must  be  preauthorized  by  the  cus- 
tomer.  Specific  arrangements  for  the  transfers  will 
be  the  subject  of  an  agreement  between  a  customer 
and  his  bank  and  will  presumably  vary  from  bank  to 
bank  and  from  customer  to  customer.  In  general, 
however,  once  a  customer  has  contracted  for  the 
service,  transfers  will  be  triggered  automatically  and 
without  any  further  authorization  whenever  the  cus- 
tomer’s  checking  balance  falls  below  some  agreed 
minimum  level.2  The  amendment  became  effective 
November  1,  1978. 
The  amendment  is  generally  regarded  as  one  of  the 
more  important  developments  in  retail  banking  in 
recent  years.  While  it  is  impossible  at  this  time  to 
gauge  the  impact  of  the  amendment  with  a  high 
degree  of  certainty,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  it  has  poten- 
tially  significant  implications  with  respect  to  (1)  the 
relationship  between  banks  and  their  household  cus- 
tomers,  (2)  competitive  relationships  between  com- 
mercial  banks  and  nonbank  depository  institutions, 
(3)  the  earnings  of  banks  and  other  financial  insti- 
tutions  that  offer  the  service,  and  (4)  the  conduct  of 
monetary  policy.  This  article  will  show  that  the 
authorization  of  automatic  transfers  is  not  a  radical 
*The  author  thanks  Bruce  J.  Summers  for  very  helpful 
comments  on  an  earlier  draft  of  this  article. 
1 The  FDIC  has  adopted  a  similar  amendment.  Conse- 
quently,  the  authority  to  make  automatic  transfers  has 
been  extended  to  all  insured  commercial  banks  and  all 
mutual  savings  banks  insured  by  the  FDIC. A  lawsuit 
challenging  the  authority  of  the  agencies  to  issue  the 
amendment  was  denied  by  the  U.  S.  District  Court  for 
the  District  of  Columbia,  United  States  League  of  Sav- 
ings  Associations  v.  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System,  et  al.,  Civil  No.  78-0878  (D.D.C.,  filed 
October  31,  1978). 
2 Therefore,  the  automatic  transfer  service  will  differ 
from  such  currently  permitted  services  as  the  payment 
of  regularly  recurring  bills  from  savings  accounts  and 
services  where  the  customer  is  able  to  order,  by  tele- 
phone,  individually  specified  transfers  from  his  savings 
account  to  his  checking  account  or  to  third  parties. 
regulatory  development  but  rather  the  latest  event  in 
a  longer  run  evolution  affecting  all  depository  insti- 
tutions.  The  article  will  describe  this  evolution  and 
indicate  the  relationship  of  automatic  transfers  to  it. 
It  also  summarizes  the  detailed  provisions  of  the 
amendment,  and  speculates  on  some  of  the  amend- 
ment’s  major  potential  implications. 
I.  A  BRIEF  PERSPECTIVE 
To  understand  where  the  automatic  transfer  ser- 
vice  stands  in  relation  to  other  recent  developments 
in  banking,  it  is  necessary  to  recognize  its  most 
important  feature.  Specifically,  the  service  will  en- 
able  some  depositors-the  exact  number  depending 
on  the  terms  under  which  the  service  is  offered-to 
reduce  their  demand  balances.  Therefore,  the  amend- 
ment  authorizing  automatic  transfers  can  be  prop- 
erly  viewed  as  the  latest  in  a  series  of  events  over  the 
last  decade  or  so  that  have  increased  the  extent  to 
which  the  public  has  been  able  to  use  interest-earning 
deposits  for  purposes  previously  requiring  non- 
interest-earning  demand  balances.3  The  important 
events  in  this  evolution  are  outlined  in  the  Box.  The 
initial  development  occurred  in  1970  when  the  Fed- 
eral  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  authorized  federally 
chartered  savings  and  loan  associations  to  make  pre- 
authorized  non-negotiable  transfers  from  savings 
accounts  to  third  parties  for  recurring  household- 
related  expenditures.  Subsequent  developments  have 
included  (1)  the  introduction  and  extension  of  ne- 
gotiable  order  of  withdrawal  (NOW)  accounts  at 
thrift  institutions4  and  commercial  banks  in  New 
England  and  more  recently  New  York,  (2)  the 
introduction  of  share  draft  accounts  at  federally 
chartered  credit  unions,  (3)  the  proliferation  of  auto- 
3  As  a  result  of  these  developments,  some  economists 
now  use  the  term  “transaction  balances”  to  designate  all 
balances  in  all  types  of  accounts  that  are  held  against 
anticipated  current  expenditures  as  opposed  to  balances 
held  to  meet  longer  term  or  emergency  contingencies. 
4  Throughout  this  article  the  term  “thrift  institution”  will 
refer  to  nonbank  depository  institutions  such  as  mutual 
savings  banks,  savings  and  loan  associations,  and  credit 
unions. 
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September  1970  The  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank 
Board  permitted  federally  chartered  savings  and 
loan  associations  to  make  preauthorized  nonnego- 
tiable  transfers  from  savings  accounts  to  third 
parties  for  household-related  expenditures. 
June  1972  State-chartered  mutual  savings  banks 
in  Massachusetts  began  offering  NOW  accounts 
following  a  favorable  ruling  of  the  Massachusetts 
Supreme  Court.  NOW  accounts  are  functionally 
equivalent  to  interest-bearing  checking  accounts. 
September  1972  State-chartered  mutual  savings 
banks  in  New  Hampshire  began  offering  NOW 
accounts. 
January  1974  Federal  legislation  authorized  all 
depository  institutions  except  credit  unions  in 
Massachusetts  and  New  Hampshire  to  offer  NOW 
accounts. 
January  1974  First  Federal  Savings  and  Loan  of 
Lincoln,  Nebraska,  installed  customer-bank  com- 
munications  terminals  in  two  supermarkets  en- 
abling  customers  to  withdraw  funds  from  their 
savings  accounts  to  pay  for  items  purchased  from 
the  stores. 
Early  1974  Money  market  mutual  funds  became 
widespread.  These  funds  permit  shareholders  to 
redeem  shares  either  by  checks  drawn  on  desig- 
nated  commercial  bank  accounts,  by  wire  transfer, 
by  telephone  or  by  mail. 
August  1974  The  National  Credit  Union  Admini- 
stration  permitted  Federal  credit  unions  to  issue 
share  drafts  which,  like  NOW  accounts,  are  func- 
tionally  equivalent  to  interest-bearing  checking 
accounts. 
November  1974  Commercial  banks  were  authorized 
to  accept  savings  deposits  from  state  and  local 
governments. 
April  1975  Commercial  banks  were  authorized  to 
transfer  funds  from  a  savings  deposit  to  a  checking 
account  upon  receipt  of  a  depositor’s  telephone 
order. 
April  1975  The  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board 
extended  its  1970  action  by  permitting  federally 
chartered  savings  and  loan  associations  to  make 
preauthorized  transfers  from  savings  accounts  to 
third  parties  for  any  purpose. 
September  1975  Commercial  banks  were  permitted 
to  make  preauthorized  nonnegotiable  transfers  from 
savings  accounts  to  third  parties  for  any  purpose. 
November  1975  Commercial  banks  were  authorized 
to  accept  savings  deposits  from  partnerships  and 
corporations  operated  for  profit,  limited  to  $150,000 
per  customer  per  bank.  In  conjunction  with  tele- 
phone-ordered  transfers,  this  authority  made  it 
possible  for  small  businesses  to  earn  interest  on 
funds  that  can  be  readily  used  for  transactions. 
February  1976  Federal  legislation  extended  NOW 
account  authority  to  all  New  England  States. 
October  1978  Federal  legislation  extended  NOW 
account  authority  to  New  York  State. 
November  1978  Commercial  banks  were  authorized 
to  offer  automatic  transfers  from  savings  deposits 
to  demand  deposits. 
Source:  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  System  [10,  pp.  30-32]. 
mated  teller  machines  and  similar  facilities,  (4)  the 
authorization  of  banks  to  accept  corporate  savings 
accounts,  and  (5)  the  authorization  of  banks  to  make 
telephone-ordered  transfers  from  savings  accounts 
to  checking  accounts. 
Perhaps  more  interesting  than  the  specific  develop- 
ments  in  the  evolution  are  the  underlying  forces  pro- 
pelling  them.  These  changes  have  occurred  simul- 
taneously  with  the  flowering  of  the  consumer  move- 
ment,  and  it  is  probable  that  this  coincidence  accounts 
in  part  for  the  political  support  accorded  such  inno- 
vations  as  NOW  accounts.  The  steady  rise  in  market 
interest  rates,  which  has  increased  the  opportunity 
cost  of  holding  non-interest-bearing  deposits,  has  also 
undoubtedly  been  a  factor.  Further,  some  of  the 
developments  have  been  a  direct  outgrowth  of  tech- 
nological  advances  associated  with  the  emergence  of 
electronic  funds  transfer  systems. 
In  addition  to  these  factors,  the  evolution  also 
appears  to  reflect  important  changes  in  the  condition 
of  the  thrift  industry  and  in  competitive  relationships 
between  thrifts  and  commercial  banks  over  the  last 
10 to  12 years.  In  the  immediate  post-World-War  II 
period  and  during  the  1950’s  housing  demand  was 
strong  due  to  wartime  construction  postponements 
and  rising  family  formations.  As  a  result,  thrift 
institutions,  particularly  savings  and  loan  associ- 
ations,  grew  rapidly  throughout  the  first  two  postwar 
decades.5  Moreover,  with  a  relatively  steep  upward- 
5 According  to  the  Hunt  Commission  Report  [ll,  pp. 
34-35],  between  1945  and  1965  the  total  assets  of  savings 
and  loan  associations  and  mutual  savings  banks  increased 
at  compound  annual  rates  exceeding  14  percent  and  6 
percent,  respectively.  The  rate  for  commercial  banks 
was  4  percent.  During  this  same  period  the  commercial 
bank  share  of  total  assets  held  by  all  depository  institu- 
tions  declined  to  67  percent  from  86  percent. 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1978 sloping  yield  curve  in  place  during  this  period,  the 
juxtaposition  of  generally  long-term  mortgage-domi- 
nated  asset  portfolios  and  predominantly  short-term 
time  and  savings  deposit  liabilities  on  thrift  balance 
sheets  produced  no  significant  structural  difficulties. 
On  the  contrary,  thrift  operations  were  highly  profit- 
able. 
Conditions  changed  rather  dramatically,  however, 
in  the  late  1960’s.  Spreads  between  short-  and  long- 
term  interest  rates  were  narrower  on  the  average 
during  this  period  than  in  earlier  years,  reflected  in  a 
flatter  and  sometimes  downward-sloping  yield  curve. 
Given  the  maturity  structure  of  thrift  assets  and 
liabilities,  this  development  squeezed  thrift  profit 
margins.  These  difficulties  were  compounded  by 
stronger  competition  from  commercial  banks  for 
household  time  and  savings  deposits.6  Moreover, 
virtually  all  thrifts  suffered  sharp  reductions  in  de- 
posit  growth  during  the  periods  of  restrictive  mone- 
tary  policy  in  1966  and  1969-1970. 
This  change  in  the  fortunes  of  the  thrifts  troubled 
the  industry  itself,  its  regulators,  and  others  con- 
cerned  about  the  politically  sensitive  longer  run  pros- 
pects  for  housing  finance.  The  Hunt  Commission 
Report,  issued  in  1971,  addressed  this  problem  among 
others.  One  of  its  major  recommendations  was  that 
thrifts  be  allowed  a  broader  range  of  activities  in 
order  that  they  might  break  out  of  the  bind  imposed 
by  the  structure  of  their  balance  sheets.7  The  Com- 
mission  proposed  that  the  lending  and  investing 
powers  of  savings  and  loan  associations  and  mutual 
savings  banks  be  extended  and  that  these  institutions 
be  allowed  to  offer  third-party  payment  services, 
including  ordinary  checking  accounts,  to  nonbusiness 
customers. 
The  Hunt  Commission  Report  has  led  to  the  intro- 
duction  of  several  comprehensive  legislative  programs 
in  the  Congress  to  “reform”  depository  institutions 
and  markets  and  their  regulators.  The  sweeping 
6 In  testimony  during  the  hearings  on  the  FINE  “Dis- 
cussion  Principles,”  the  National  Association  of  Mutual 
Savings  Banks  presented  data  drawn  from  the  Federal 
Reserve  flow  of  funds  accounts  indicating  that  the  sav- 
ings  and  loan  association  share  of  the  growth  of  house- 
hold  time  and  savings  deposits  declined  from  46.9  percent 
in  the  1946-1956  period  to  34.1  percent  in  the  1966-1974 
period.  The  mutual  savings  bank  share  declined  from 
23.2  percent  to  11.9  percent,  while  the  commercial  bank 
share  increased  from  29.9  percent  to  54.0  percent.  U.  S. 
Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Banking,  Currency  and 
Housing,  Financial  Institutions  and  the  Nation’s  Econ- 
omy  (FINE)  “Discussion  Principles,”  Hearings,  before 
a  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Banking,  Currency 
and  Housing,  House  of  Representatives,  94th  Cong.,  1st 
and  2nd  sess.,  1975,  p.  865. 
7 For  general  background  on  the  Hunt  Commission  pre- 
pared  by  the  co-directors  of  the  Commission’s  profes- 
sional  staff,  see  [6,  pp.  9-20]. 
scope  of  these  proposals  has  produced  to  date  enough 
anxiety  in  all  quarters  to  prevent  passage  of  the 
Commission’s  principal  recommendations.  Faced 
with  political  inertia  at  the  national  level,  some  ele- 
ments  within  the  thrift  industry  have  sought  to  ex- 
pand  their  powers  by  other  means.  Of  specific  rele- 
vance  to  this  article,  some  thrifts,  particularly  the 
mutual  savings  banks  in  the  Northeast  and  the 
emerging  credit  unions,  have  worked  vigorously  to 
gain  and  promote  third-party  payment  services  in 
order  to  compete  more  effectively  with  commercial 
banks.8  Several  of  the  most  important  innovations 
listed  in  the  accompanying  Box  were  initiated  by 
thrifts,  including  NOW  accounts,  credit  union  share 
drafts,  and  the  installation  of  point-of-sale  terminals 
in supermarkets. 
Among  the  various  initiatives  of  the  thrifts  to  ex- 
pand  their  deposit  service  powers,  the  most  important 
in  terms  of  its  potential  longer  run  effects  on  all 
depository  institutions  was  probably  the  introduction 
of  NOW  accounts  in  Massachusetts  and  New  Hamp- 
shire  in  1972  at  the  instigation  of  the  Consumer 
Savings  Bank  of  Worcester,  Massachusetts,  a  mutual 
savings  bank.9  At  that  time,  savings  banks  in  the 
New  England  States  did  not  have  the  power  to  offer 
ordinary  demand  deposits,  and  earlier  efforts  to  ob- 
tain  that  authority  by  state  legislation  in  Connecticut, 
New  Hampshire,  and  Massachusetts  had  failed.  The 
NOW  innovation  circumvented  this  restriction  by 
tying  third-party  payment  powers  to  savings  ac- 
counts,  which  the  savings  banks  were  empowered  to 
offer.  But  this  action  introduced  a  new  and  highly 
significant  element  into  the  picture,  because  NOW 
accounts,  although  legally  a  form  of  savings  account, 
are  for  all  practical  purposes  equivalent  to  a  checking 
account  that  bears  explicit  interest.  The  growth  of 
the  NOW  instrument  in  New  England  and  the  sub- 
sequent  introduction  of  the  similar  share  draft  ac- 
count  by  credit  unions  elsewhere  has  forced  an  exten- 
sive  reconsideration  of  the  45-year-old  prohibition  of 
interest  payments  on  demand  deposits  in  the  Con- 
gress,  regulatory  agencies,  and  the  banking  and  thrift 
8 The  savings  and  loan  industry  has  been  generally  less 
interested  in  obtaining  third-party  payment  powers  than 
the  mutual  savings  banks  and  credit  unions,  fearing  such 
powers  would  result  in  loss  of  the  interest  rate  ceiling 
differential  on  time  and  savings  deposits.  The  Federal 
Home  Loan  Bank  Board,  however,  which  regulates  feder- 
ally  chartered  associations,  has  strongly  favored  the 
extension  of  full  third-party  payment  powers  to  thrifts. 
See  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board,  A  Financial  Insti- 
tution  for  the  Future,  (Washington,  D.  C.:  Office  of 
Economic  Research,  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board, 
1975),  pp.  27-33. 
9 For  a  summary  of  the  early  history  of  NOW  accounts 
see  [4]. 
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tended  NOW  account  authority  nationwide,  a  de- 
velopment  that  would  have  substantially  reduced  the 
force  of  the  prohibition,  was  introduced  and  debated 
although  not  passed  by  Congress  in  1977.10  The 
reconsideration  has  received  added  impetus  from 
technological  developments  such  as  automated  teller 
machines  and  similar  devices  that  have  made  it  much 
easier  and  less  costly  for  individual  depositors  to 
transfer  funds  from  savings  to  checking. 
It  is  against  this  background  that  the  amendment 
permitting  automatic  transfers  from  savings  accounts 
to  checking  accounts  must  be  evaluated.  Far  from 
an  isolated  regulatory  development,  the  amendment 
is  a  natural  step  in  what  increasingly  appears  to  be 
an  inexorable  sequence  of  events,  driven  by  techno- 
logical  developments  and  changing  competitive  forces 
affecting  depository  institutions,  that  is  steadily  in- 
creasing  the  ability  of  households  to  use  interest- 
earning  accounts  for  many  of  the  purposes  for  which 
non-interest-earning  balances  were  previously  re- 
quired. 
II.  THE  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  AMENDMENT 
The  amendment  authorizing  automatic  transfers 
was  originally  proposed  by  the  Board  of  Governors 
in  March  1976.  This  initial  proposal  elicited  little 
response  from  the  general  public  and  largely  negative 
comments  from  banks  and  other  financial  institutions. 
In  retrospect  this  lack  of  interest  is  understandable 
since  the  terms  of  the  proposal  were  quite  restrictive. 
Depositors  would  have  been  required  to  forfeit  30 
days’ interest  on  amounts  transferred,  and  transfers 
would  have  had  to  be  made  in  $100  units.  To  the 
extent  they  were  aware  of  the  proposal,  potential 
users  of  the  service  apparently  did  not  find  these  con- 
ditions  attractive,  and  banks  evidently  concluded  they 
could  not  offer  the  service  profitably  subject  to  these 
restrictions.  In  the  light  of  this  reaction,  the  Board 
did  not  implement  this  initial  proposal. 
The  proposal  was  revived  in  early  1978,  but  with 
important  revisions.  The  interest  forfeiture  penalty 
was  softened,11  and  the  $100  unit  requirement  for 
transfers  was  dropped.  The  response  to  this  second 
proposal  was  quite  different,  both  quantitatively  and 
10 Ironically,  the  legislation’s  defeat  was  due  largely  to 
thrift  opposition  arising  from  fear  that  Congress  would 
couple  the  extension  with  the  abolition  of  the  interest 
rate  ceiling  differential. 
11 Only  the  interest  actually  accrued  on  the  funds  trans- 
ferred  during  the  30  days  prior  to  the  transfer  would  have 
had  to  be  forfeited. 
qualitatively.  The  number  of  responses  received  by 
the  Board  set  a  record  for  proposals  of  this  nature. 
The  proposal  had  received  some  attention  in  the 
general  press,  which  may  account  for  the  large  num- 
ber  of  letters-many  of  them  handwritten-sent  by 
individuals.  A  majority,  approximately  52  percent, 
of  the  responses  favored  adoption. 
The  amendment  finally  enacted  by  the  Board  re- 
flects  the  second  round  of public  comments  and  there- 
fore  itself  differs  from  the  revised  proposal.  The 
amendment  has  seven  major  provisions:12 
(1)  In  offering  the  automatic  transfer  service 
banks  may  either  agree  to  make  the  transfers 
necessary  to  maintain  some  prearranged  minimum 
nonzero  balance  in  the  depositor’s  checking  ac- 
count,  or  they  may  agree  to  maintain  a  zero  check- 
ing  balance,  i.e.,  to  transfer  funds  continuously  as 
required  to  cover  checks  as  they  are  written. 
(2)  Banks  offering  the  service  will  not  be  re- 
quired  to  impose  either  an  interest  forfeiture  or  a 
service  charge  on  transfers.  (They  are  free  to 
impose  either  if  they  so  choose.)  This  provision 
constitutes  the  major  departure  from  the  Board’s 
revised  proposal.  In  commenting  on  the  revised 
proposal  a  large  number  of  financial  institutions 
had  suggested  that  the  required  interest  penalty 
be  eliminated. 
(3)  The  service  may  be  offered  to  individuals 
only. 
(4)  The  service  may  be  offered  beginning  No- 
vember  1,  1978,  six  months  after  the  date  of  the 
amendment’s  adoption.  The  delay  was  provided 
to  allow  ample  start-up  time  to  banks  planning  to 
offer  the  service.13 
(5)  The  service  is  entirely  voluntary  both  for 
banks  and  bank  customers  and  can  be  made  only 
with  the  prior  consent  of  the  customer.  (Consent 
in  the  case  of  automatic  transfers,  of  course,  is  to 
the  service,  not  to  individual  transfers.) 
(6)  A  bank  offering  the  service  must  “disclose 
prominently  and  call  to  the  attention  of  depositors” 
that  it  reserves  the  right  to  require  not  less  than 
30  days’  advance  notice  of  withdrawals  from  sav- 
ings  accounts  subject  to  transfer  just  as  it  has 
12 The  provisions  listed  here  paraphrase  those  set  forth 
in  the  Board’s  formal  announcement  of  the  amendment’s 
adoption  in  the  May  1978  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  pp. 
424-425. 
13 A  request  of  the  Independent  Bankers  Association  of 
New  York  to  delay  the  beginning  date  still  further  was 
denied  by  the  Board  on  September  13,  1978. 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1978 reserved  this  right  for  ordinary  savings  accounts 
in  the  past. 
(7)  Banks  may  arrange  with  thrift  institutions 
to  offer  jointly  automatic  transfers  from  savings 
accounts  at  thrifts  to  checking  accounts  at  banks. 
These  provisions  are  subject  to  change  as  experi- 
ence  with  automatic  transfers  accumulates.  In  its 
announcement  the  Board  stated  that  it  will  monitor 
the  effects  of  the  amendment  on  competitive  condi- 
tions  and  flows  of  funds  in  depository  markets  in 
order  to  make  whatever  modifications  seem  appropri- 
ate. 
As  presently  written,  the  amendment’s  central  fea- 
ture  is  the  high  degree  of flexibility  it  offers  to  banks 
in  packaging  the  service  and  to  customers  in  using  it. 
Banks  can  set  whatever  conditions  they  wish  with 
respect  to  such  details  as  the  frequency  and  amounts 
of  transfers,  minimum  balance  requirements,  and 
account  maintenance  fees  and  other  charges.  Pre- 
suming  there  is  at  least  moderate  variety  in  bank 
offerings  in  a  given  local  market,  an  individual  cus- 
tomer  might  be  able  to  use  the  service  to  avoid  over- 
drafts  and  overdraft  charges,  to  maintain  a  specified 
minimum  checking  balance  to  avoid  ordinary  check- 
ing  account  service  charges,  or  to  maintain  a  zero 
checking  balance,  in  accordance  with  his  character- 
istics  and  needs. 
III.  SOME  POTENTIAL  IMPLICATIONS 
This  section  will  speculate  on  some  of the  potential 
repercussions  of automatic  transfers.  The  service  has 
important  potential  implications,  ranging  from  tran- 
sitory  effects  on  banks  and  their  depositors  to  more 
lasting  effects  on  the  functioning  of  the  nation’s  pay- 
ments  system.  It  must  be  emphasized,  however,  that 
while  it  is  important  for  both  banks  and  the  general 
public  to  be  aware  of  the  potential  impact  of  auto- 
matic  transfers,  it  is  not  possible  to  predict  either 
the  magnitude  or  the  timing  of  these  effects  with  high 
confidence. 
Apart  from  the  possibility  of  future  modification  of 
the  amendment,  the  significance  of  automatic  trans- 
fers-especially  during  the  first  year  following  their 
promulgation-will  depend  largely  on  how  aggres- 
sively  banks  promote  the  service  and  how  favorably 
the  service  is  received  by  the  public.  Neither  factor 
can  be  foreseen  with  much  certainty.  For  these  rea- 
sons,  what  follows  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  set 
of  predictions  but  rather  as  illustrations  of  what 
might  occur  under  certain  specific  hypothetical  con- 
ditions.  The  first  part  of  the  section  will  discuss 
some  of  the  immediate  implications  of  the  amend- 
ment  for  banks  and  bank  customers  with  the  aid  of 
Table  I.  The  latter  part  will  speculate  on  some  of  the 
broader  and  more  permanent  effects.14 
Appeal  to  Depositors  Sections  I  and  II  of 
Table  I  present  information  that  might  help  deter- 
mine  the  appeal  of  automatic  transfers  to  depositors 
at  a  typical  medium-sized  or  large  bank  in  an  urban 
or  suburban  area.  Section  I  lists  the  assumptions 
underlying  the  analysis.  Lines  I.B  and  I.C  show  the 
various  assumed  charges  and  interest  rates  faced  by 
the  depositor  before  and  after  the  introduction  of 
automatic  transfers,  respectively.  In  both  cases  an 
attempt  was  made  to  specify  what  might  be  regarded 
as  median  or  “typical”  service  charges.15  As  anyone 
familiar  with  the  banking  industry  knows,  however, 
there  is  extraordinary  variation  in  both  the  form  and 
level  of  such  charges  across  banks.  Therefore,  the 
assumptions  are  a  rough  approximation  at  best. 
Banks  will  apparently  offer  automatic  transfers  in 
two  basic  forms  :  (1)  as  overdraft  protection  and 
(2)  as  what  might  be  called  “interest  maximization” 
accounts.16  The  latter  appear  to  be  the  more  impor- 
tant  and  are  the  only  type  considered  in  the  remain- 
der  of  this  article.  These  accounts  will  generally 
involve  a  linked  checking  account  and  savings  ac- 
count.  The  bank  will  agree  to  maintain  a  very  low 
balance  (for  many  banks  zero)  in  the  checking 
account,  transferring  any  surplus  funds  to  savings 
14 On  October  16,  1978,  when  this  article  was  in  the  late 
stages  of  preparation,  Congress  unexpectedly  extended 
the  authority  to  offer  NOW  accounts  to  all  federally 
chartered  commercial  banks  and  thrifts  in  New  York 
State.  Prior  to  the  passage  of  this  legislation,  banks  and 
thrifts  in  the  State  had  been  preparing  to  offer  automatic 
transfers.  Since  NOW  accounts  and  the  most  important 
forms  of  automatic  transfer  accounts  are  in  some  respects 
substitutes  from  the  standpoints  of  both  offering  institu- 
tions  and  depositors.  the  legislation  renders  the  effects  of 
the  automatic  transfer  amendment  even  less  certain  in 
New  York  than  elsewhere.  This  article  does  not  attempt 
to  take  account  of  this  late  development. 
The  legalization  of  NOW’s  in  New  York  increases  the 
probability  that  NOW  account  authority  will  be  extended 
nationwide  at  an  early  date.  In  that  event  automatic 
transfers  would  probably  serve  as  a  transition  step  to 
NOW’S  Even  so,  automatic  transfers  may  not  be 
hastily  abandoned  because  larger  banks  have  already 
invested  sizable  sums  in  preparing  the  operational  mech- 
anisms  and  promotional  programs  to  support  transfers. 
Support  requirements  for  NOW  accounts  are  different. 
15  By  mid-October  1978,  a  sizable  number  of  larger 
banks  had  announced  preliminary  prices  for  automatic 
transfer  services.  Many  of  these  announcements  were 
reported  in  the  American  Banker  newspaper  in  August, 
September,  and  October. 
16  The  main  difference  between  the  two  forms  of  service 
relates  to  the  anticipated  frequency  of  transfers.  Over- 
draft  protection  accounts  are  designed  to  accommodate 
relatively  infrequent  transfers,  whereas  interest  maximi- 
zation  accounts  are  intended  to  handle  more  frequent 
transfers. 
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transfers  from  the  savings  account,  typically  for  the 
exact  amount  of  the  check.  A  majority  of  the  banks 
intend  to  impose  a  fixed  monthly  maintenance  charge 
for  this  service  and  an  additional  fee  per  check.  A 
number  of banks  also  plan  to  offer  the  service  without 
charge  to  depositors  who  maintain  minimum  com- 
bined  balances  exceeding  some  specified  amount.17 
The  prices  assumed  in  Lines  I.C2  and  I.C3  appear 
to  lie  somewhere  between  the  relatively  liberal  terms 
announced  by  several  large  West  Coast  banks  and  the 
more  stringent  terms  likely  to  prevail  in  the  East. 
Section  II  of  the  table  attempts  to  suggest  what 
kinds  of  households,  as  indexed  by  their  checking 
and  savings  account  balances  and  account  activity 
levels,  might  find  this  “typical”  automatic  transfer 
offer  attractive.  Since  it  is  assumed  the  service  will 
be  offered  free  to  depositors  who  maintain  a  mini- 
mum  balance  exceeding  $3500,  all  households  holding 
minimum  combined  checking  and  savings  balances 
over  this  level  before  the  introduction  of  automatic 
transfers  would  benefit  from  the  service.  The  amount 
of  the  gain  for  these  depositors  would  increase  with 
the  depositor’s  average  checking  balance  and  his  ac- 
count’s  activity  (the  latter  because  he  is  assumed  to 
be  paying  $.10  currently  for  each  check  written). 
Although  all  depositors  in  this  class  would  gain  from 
the  service,  it  is  unlikely  that  all  would  use  it  even 
where  it  were  conveniently  available.  Depositors 
with  relatively  small  and  inactive  checking  accounts 
before  automatic  transfers  might  not  consider  the 
small  gain  worth  the  trouble  of opening  new  accounts. 
Further,  surveys  of  consumer  attitudes  toward  the 
service  have  suggested  that  many  potential  users  fear 
it  might  compromise  the  integrity  of  the  savings 
account  by  making  ii  easier  to  indulge  in  unintended 
spending  out  of  funds  originally  set  aside  as  longer 
term  savings. 
Depositors  with  a  combined  minimum  balance 
below  $3500  in  this  example  would  be  charged.  Sec- 
tion  II.B  of  the  table  attempts  to  indicate  the  con- 
ditions  under  which  depositors  in  this  class  might 
find  automatic  transfer  accounts  advantageous.  As 
indicated,  this  determination  would  require  a  com- 
parison  of  (1)  the  gain  from  interest  paid  on  funds 
formerly  held  idle  in  a  non-interest-bearing  checking 
account  that  could  now  be  held  in  an  interest-bearing 
savings  account  and  (2)  the  net  increase  in  service 
charges.  The  data  in  the  two  numerical  tables  permit 
such  a  calculation  for  a  variety  of  account  behavior 
17 In  the  case  of  zero  checking  balance  arrangements, 
the  minimum  combined  balance  by  definition  refers  to 
the  minimum  balance  in  the  savings  account. 
If  the  various  terms  assumed  are  at  all  representa- 
tive,  it  is  obvious  that  the  service  will  appeal  mainly 
to  the  minority  of  depositors  who  maintain  relatively 
high  balances  in  their  checking  account.  Many  of 
the  larger  banks  are  planning  to  emphasize  this  point 
as  candidly  as  possible  in  promoting  the  service. 
Effects  on  Bank  Profits  During  the  Transition 
It  is  probable  that  the  introduction  of  automatic 
transfers  will  have  some  effect  on  commercial  bank 
profits.  It  is  even  more  likely  that  the  magnitude 
and  timing  of  this  effect  will  vary  widely  from  bank  to 
bank,  reflecting  differences  in  the  competitive  condi- 
tions  faced  by  individual  banks. 
Section  III  of  Table  I  presents  a  simplified  ex- 
ample  of  the  possible  effect  of  automatic  transfers  on 
the  before-tax  earnings  of  a  Federal  Reserve  member 
bank  with  total  deposits  in  the  $600-700  million 
range  during  the  first  year  the  service  is  offered.  The 
analysis  is  based  on  a  set  of  specific,  hypothetical 
assumptions  regarding  such  factors  as  (1)  the  per- 
centage  of eligible  household  demand  deposit  balances 
shifted  to  savings  accounts  subject  to  transfer  and 
(2)  service  charge  policy  before  and  after  the  inau- 
guration  of  automatic  transfers.  Most  of  the  data 
on  which  the  analysis  is  based  were  taken  from  the 
18 For  simplicity,  the  service  charge  assumption  in  Line 
I.B1  in  the  table  ignores  the  common  current  practice  in 
some  markets  of  providing  free  checking  services  for 
relatively  modest  minimum  balances.  The  net  service 
charge  increases  shown  in  the  table  understate  the  in- 
creases  that  depositors  able  to  take  advantage  of  these 
current  programs  would  experience. 
19 The  interest  gains  shown  in  the  table  are  on  a  before- 
tax  basis.  The  after-tax  benefit  would  be  smaller.  Also, 
most  checking  account  customers  presently  earn  “implicit 
interest”  in  the  form  of  free  services  or  service  charges 
that  are  below  the  costs  the  bank  incurs  in  providing 
checking  services.  Unlike  explicit  interest,  implicit  inter- 
est  is  not  taxed.  Therefore,  to  the  extent  that  automatic 
transfers  substituted  explicit  for  implicit  interest,  this  tax 
benefit  would  be  lost.  Hence  the  tables  probably  under- 
state  the  checking  balance  levels  at  which  automatic 
transfers  would  be  advantageous.  For  a  discussion  of 
implicit  interest,  see  [9]. 
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characteristics.  Column  (6)  of  the  upper  table  pre- 
sents  the  net  increase  in  service  charges  for  accounts 
at  several  different  activity  levels.18  In  general,  the 
increase  is  a  rising  function  of  activity.  Column  2 
of  the  lower  table  shows  the  approximate  gross 
interest  on  funds  transferred  to  savings  at  various 
checking  balance  levels.  Together  the  two  tables 
indicate  that  depositors  who  normally  write  15  to  20 
checks  a  month  would  have  to  be  currently  holding 
an  average  checking  account  balance  in  the  $1500- 
$2000  range  to  gain  from  the  service,  and  even  at 
this  level  the  gain  would  be  nominal.19 Federal  Reserve  System’s  Functional  Cost  Analysis 
Report  for  1977.  This  Report  provides  balance  sheet 
and  income  statement  data  for  “average”  banks  in 
three  size  classifications  based  on  information  pro- 
vided  by  846  member  banks  throughout  the  nation. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  the  analysis  is  not  a  predic- 
tion  of  the  actual  transitional  effects  of  automatic 
transfers  on  the  earnings  of  most  member  banks.  No 
such  estimate  is  possible  in  the  face  of  the  wide 
variety  of  prices  and  price  policies  contemplated  by 
individual  banks.  The  aim  of  the  example  is  to  pro- 
vide  a  suggestive  benchmark  estimate  under  specific 
assumed  conditions.  Individual  banks  might  then 
alter  the  conditions  and  the  estimate  to  fit  their  indi- 
vidual  situations.  The  specific  conditions  assumed 
include  the  pre-  and  post-automatic  transfer  price 
and  interest  rate  terms  in  Section  I  of  the  table  along 
with  the  additional  assumptions  noted  in  Section  III 
of the  table.  Therefore,  as  in  the  preceding  section  of 
the  article,  the  focus  is  on  zero-balance  automatic 
transfer  accounts  offered  without  charge  to  depositors 
with  minimum  balances  over  $3500. 
The  analysis  takes  account  of  three  of  the  major 
factors  likely  to  affect  member  bank  earnings  during 
the  transition  to  automatic  transfers.20  These  are: 
(1)  the  increased  interest  expense  due  to  shifts  in 
deposits  from  demand  to  savings  accounts  (Lines 
III.A  to  III.C)  ;  (2)  the  net  gain  or  loss  from  ser- 
vice  charges  (Lines  III.D  to  III.F)  ;  and  (3)  addi- 
tional  earnings  that  result  from  the  lending  or  invest- 
ment  of  required  reserves  released  as  a  result  of 
shifts  from  demand  to  savings  deposits  (Lines  III.G 
to  III.L).  The  principal  factors  omitted  from  the 
analysis  are  the  potential  impacts  of  automatic  trans- 
fers  on  (1)  bank  non-interest  costs  (in  this  example 
mainly  accounting  and  computer  expenses)  and  (2) 
overdraft  fees.  Information  that  would  have  per- 
mitted  estimation  of  these  effects  was  not  readily 
available. 
The  estimate  of  additional  interest  expense  (an 
increase  of  $607,000  in  this  example)  essentially 
follows  from  the  assumption  (Line  III.B)  that  20 
percent  of  the  bank’s  dollar  volume  of  household 
demand  deposits  would  be  converted  to  savings  bal- 
ances  during  the  first  year  automatic  transfers  are 
available.  This  estimate  is  based  on  a  separate  esti- 
mate  of  the joint  distribution  of  demand  and  savings 
deposits  by  account  size  using  Federal  Reserve  Func- 
tional  Cost  Analysis  data  on  the  individual  size 
20 The  methodology  employed  here  is  straightforward 
and  follows  the  procedures  used  in  several  recent  esti- 
mates  of  the  similar  potential  effect  of  nationwide  NOW 
accounts  on  bank  profits.  See  [5,  10]. 
distributions  of  demand  and  savings  deposits,  respec- 
tively.21  This  separate  analysis  suggested  that  per- 
haps  as  much  as  60  percent  of  the  dollar  volume  of 
the  “average”  large  bank’s  household  demand  de- 
posits  might  be  presently  lodged  in  accounts  that 
would  benefit  from  being  shifted  to  savings  deposits 
subject  to  transfer,  reflecting  the  surprisingly  high 
percentage  of  household  demand  and  savings  balances 
in  high  balance  accounts.22  It  was  somewhat  arbi- 
trarily  assumed  that  40  percent  would  actually  con- 
vert  over  a  three-year  transition  period,  with  20 
percent  converting  during  the  first  year.  This  esti- 
mate  is  close  to  the  first  year  conversion  factors  esti- 
mated  and  publicly  announced  by  some  large  banks. 
Lines  III.D  to  III.F  estimate  the  net  change  in. 
service  charge  revenues  using  the  stated  activity  level 
assumptions  in  conjunction  with  the  before  and  after 
charge  schedule  in  Section  I  of  the  table.  Underlying 
these  calculations  are  data  on  the  number  of personal. 
demand  accounts  in  various  size  categories  at  an 
average  large  bank.  These  data  were  also  developed 
in  the  separate  analysis  mentioned  above.  As  indi- 
cated,  the  bank  in  this  example  would  experience  a 
moderate  net  reduction  in  service  charge  revenue. 
This  follows  directly  from  (1)  the  assumption  that 
the  bank  would  offer  automatic  transfers  free  for  a 
minimum  balance  of $3500  and  (2)  an  estimate  based 
on  the  separate  analysis  that  fully  80  percent  of  con- 
verted  balances  would  be  in  accounts  that  qualify  for 
the  free  service.  Obviously,  this  percentage  would 
be  sensitive  to  the  minimum  balance  level  for  free 
service,  if  any,  set  by  an  individual  bank. 
Lines  III.G  to  III.L  suggest  that  the  return  on  the 
investment  of  released  required  reserves  would  pro- 
vide  a  modest  offset  to  the  additional  interest  expense 
shown  on  Line  III.C.  The  offset  would  be  larger  for 
banks  having  a  higher  marginal  required  reserve 
requirement  ratio  on  demand  deposits  and  lower  for 
banks  having  a  lower  ratio. 
The  final  line  suggests  that  the  bank  in  this  ex- 
ample  might  experience  a  reduction  of  before-tax 
earnings  on  the  order  of  5½  percent  during  the 
initial  year  of  the  transition  to  automatic  transfers. 
It  should  be  emphasized  again  that  this  estimate  re- 
21 See  [3,  Tables  7.2  and  8.2].  Table  7.2  shows  the 
distribution  of  total  demand  balances  including  nonper- 
sonal  balances.  This  distribution  served  as  a  benchmark 
for  an  estimate  of  the  distribution  of  personal  demand 
balances. 
22 The  analysis  indicated  that  the  major  portion  of  the 
funds  would  be  shifted  from  checking  accounts  with 
average  balances  that  currently  exceed  $3000.  Functional 
cost  data  indicate  that  between  60  and  65  percent  of 
household  demand  balances  are  in  such  accounts. 
10  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1978 flects  the  assumptions  from  which  it  was  derived.  It 
does  not  take  account  of  differences  in  competitive 
conditions  or  differences  in  individual  depositor  char- 
acteristics  faced  by  different  banks.  Some  banks  will 
experience  little  or  no  reduction.  Others  will  prob- 
ably  experience  greater  reductions.  The  most  strik- 
ing  result  of  the  analysis  is  its  suggestion  that  due 
to  the  existing  size  distribution  of  personal  account 
balances,  banks  offering  the  service  without  charge 
for  minimum  balances  in  the  $3500  range  or  less 
will  not  receive  an  offset  to  their  increased  interest 
expense  from  higher  service  charge  revenue.  On  the 
contrary,  they  might  anticipate  some  net  decline  in 
these  revenues. 
Economic  Efficiency  The  two  preceding  sec- 
tions  described  two  of  the  more  immediate  potential 
effects  of  automatic  transfers.  This  section  and  the 
next  section  deal  briefly  with  two  of  the  possible 
longer  run  ramifications.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
points  made  below  are  not  uniquely  relevant  to  auto- 
matic  transfers  but  would  be  associated  with  any 
regulatory  or  technological  change  tending  to  in- 
crease  the  extent  to  which  depositors  are  able  to  use 
interest-bearing  deposits  for  purposes  previously  re- 
quiring  non-interest-bearing  demand  balances. 
Economists  have  argued  that  removal  of  the  cur- 
rent  prohibition  of  explicit  interest  on  demand  de- 
posits  would  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  nation’s 
payments  mechanism  in  two  ways.23  First,  it  would 
reduce  the  wasteful  shifting  of  funds  between  de- 
mand  and  savings  deposits  that  results  from  the 
efforts  of  depositors  to  maximize  the  return  on  their 
transaction  balances.  Second,  it  would  improve  the 
allocation  of  economic  resources  in  the  aggregate. 
The  logic  of  the  second  claim  runs  along  the  follow- 
ing  lines.  Most  household  depositors  currently  earn 
an  “implicit”  return  on  their  demand  balances  in  the 
form  of  a  remission  of  service  charges.24  Obviously, 
this  implicit  return  can  only  be  realized  in  the  form 
of  checking  services,  thereby  severely  restricting  the 
depositor’s  use  of  the  return.  If  the  return  were 
paid  in  the  form  of  explicit  money  interest,  many 
households  would  probably  use  it  to  consume  other 
goods  or  services.  Resource  allocation  would  then 
more  nearly  reflect  consumer  preferences. 
The  first  of  these  two  arguments  is  less  relevant  to 
23 The  term  “efficiency”  is  used  here  in  its  technical 
economic  sense:  i.e.,  the  efficiency  with  which  basic  labor 
and  capital  resources  are  allocated  among  competing 
uses. 
24 See  footnote  19  above  and  the  article  by  Klein  cited 
there. 
automatic  transfers  than  to  the  outright  removal  of 
the  ban  on  explicit  interest  on  demand  accounts  or 
to  NOW  accounts  because  automatic  transfers  re- 
quire  the  continued  maintenance  of  distinct  checking 
and  savings  accounts.  Resources  must  still  be  used 
to  shift  funds  back  and  forth  between  the  accounts, 
although-depending  again  on  how  banks  price  the 
service--the  burden  may  be  shifted  to  some  extent 
from  depositors  to  banks  or  to  those  who  borrow 
from  banks. 
The  second  argument  is  relevant  to  automatic 
transfers,  but  only  under  certain  conditions.  The 
essence  of  this  argument  is  that  if  explicit  interest 
were  permitted,  efficiency  would  increase  because 
explicit,  pecuniary  interest  would  be  substituted  for 
implicit  interest.  Because  implicit  interest  is  simply 
the  provision  of  payments  services  to  depositors  free 
or  at  fees  below  the  value  of  the  resources  used  in 
producing  the  services,  the  existence  of  implicit  in- 
terest  invites  excessive  use  of  these  services  and 
therefore  virtually  guarantees  a  misallocation  of  re- 
sources.  If  banks  used  automatic  transfers  to  reduce 
implicit  interest  payments,  efficiency  in  the  use  of 
resources  to  carry  out  payments  transactions  would 
probably  increase,  even  though  the  precise  magnitude 
of  this  benefit  might  be  difficult  to  measure.25  On 
the  other  hand,  if  banks  offer  automatic  transfers 
either  without  charge  or  at  a  low  fee  on  a  wide- 
spread  basis,  implicit  interest  payments  would  not  be 
eliminated.  Indeed,  they  might  not  even  be  signifi- 
cantly  reduced.  In  these  circumstances  efficiency 
gains  would  be  small  or  nonexistent. 
The  charge  schedules  announced  for  automatic 
transfers  to  date  by  individual  banks  suggest  that  the 
substitution  of  explicit  for  implicit  interest  will  pro- 
ceed  slowly.  As  time  passes,  however,  the  existence 
of  automatic  transfers  and  the  additional  costs  asso- 
ciated  with  providing  them  may  gradually  increase 
the  incentives  for  banks  to  raise  customer  fees  for 
checking  and  other  payments  services,  thereby  re- 
ducing  implicit  interest  and  the  inefficiencies  arising 
from  it.  Increasingly  conservative  pricing  policies 
have  characterized  the  NOW  account  experience  in 
New England.26 
Implications  for  the  Conduct  of  Monetary  Policy 
In  addition  to  their  potential  consequences  in  the 
areas  already  discussed,  automatic  transfers  may 
25 At  the  time  this  article  was  prepared  a  few  banks  had 
indicated  they  planned  to  review  all  of  their  service 
charges  in  conjunction  with  the  introduction  of  automatic 
transfers. 
26 See  Kimball  [8,  pp.  34-38]. 
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mentation  of  monetary  policy.  Economists  have  long 
recognized  that  the  prohibition  of  explicit  interest  on 
demand  deposits  and,  by  extension,  the  progressive 
erosion  of the  force  of  that  prohibition  due  to  techno- 
logical  developments  and  other  changes  raises  major 
theoretical  and  practical  questions  regarding  the 
definition  of  the  money  supply  and  the  stability  of  the 
demand  for  money,  however  defined,  with  respect  to 
interest  rates  and  income.27  If  automatic  transfers 
lead  to  substantial  shifts  from  demand  to  savings 
deposits,  their  introduction  might  produce  the  kinds 
of  effects  contemplated  by  those  concerned  with  these 
broader  questions.  It  was  suggested  above  that  any 
such  shifting  might  be  small  initially,  in  which  case 
the  practical  importance  of  these  effects  may  not  be 
very  great  in  the  immediate  future. 
Nonetheless,  the  initiation  of  automatic  transfers 
is  likely  to  create  some  problems  of  interpretation  at 
an  early  date  for  both  Federal  Reserve  policymakers 
and  others  who  monitor  monetary  policy.  The  pro- 
cedures  currently  used  in  implementing  monetary 
policy  include  setting  both  longer  run  targets  and 
short-run  tolerance  ranges  for  the  growth  rates  of 
various  monetary  aggregates.  Automatic  transfers 
may  temporarily  complicate  the  use  of  these  pro- 
cedures,  particularly  the  interpretation  of  short-run 
growth  rates  of  the  various  aggregates.  Specifically, 
shifts  of  funds  from  demand  deposits  to  savings  de- 
posits  to  take  advantage  of  the  transfers  will  tend  to 
depress  the  growth  rate  of  the  narrowly  defined  M1 
aggregate  (which  includes  demand  but  not  savings 
deposits)  while  leaving  the  growth  of  the  boarder  M2 
aggregate  (which  includes  both)  little  changed.28 
Because  neither  the  magnitude  nor  the  timing  of  the 
shifts  induced  by  automatic  transfers  can  be  confi- 
dently  predicted,  and  since  complete  data  on  the 
shifts  will  not  be  available  on  a  current  basis,29  it 
may  be  difficult  during  the  transition  to  determine 
whether  changes  in  one-  or  two-month  growth  rates 
are  being  caused  by  changes  in  underlying  economic 
conditions  or  by  the  spread  of  automatic  transfers  or 
27 These  issues  are  well  beyond  the  scope  of  this  article, 
but  an  extensive  literature  is  available.  For  a  brief  sum- 
mary  see  [1,  pp.  72-89].  For  a  comprehensive  survey  of 
these  and  related  current  issues  in  monetary  research, 
see  [2]. 
28 This  statement  does  not  take  account  of  possible  shifts 
of  deposits  from  thrift  institutions  to  banks.  Such  shifts 
would  tend  to  raise  the  growth  rate  of  M2. 
29 The  Federal  Reserve  will,  however,  conduct  a  tele- 
phone  survey  of  a  sample  of  banks  to  estimate  the  order 
of  magnitude  of  shifts  during  the  transition.  The  survey 
is  described  in  American  Banker,  October  26,  1978,  p.  1. 
both.  Since  M2  should  not  be  strongly  affected  by 
automatic  transfers,  it  might  be  helpful  during  the 
transition  to  evaluate  M1  data  in  the  light  of  what  is 
happening  to  M2.  But  this  procedure  is  by  no  means 
foolproof  since  M2 growth  rates  are  themselves  con- 
tinuously  buffeted  by  a  variety  of  adventitious  forces 
in  the  short  run. 
The  interpretative  difficulties  introduced  into  the 
monetary  policy  process  by  the  transition  to  auto- 
matic  transfers  will  probably  be  short-lived.  But 
more  than  the  usual  degree  of  uncertainty  might 
surround  short-run  policy  actions  during  the  early 
weeks  of  the  transition.  Experienced  Fed  policy 
watchers  recognize  the  potential  confusion.  Their 
awareness  should  limit  any  disruption. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This  article  began  by  considering  automatic  trans- 
fers  in  an  evolutionary  context.  It  was  suggested 
that  the  amendment  to  Regulation  Q  allowing  the 
service  was  the  latest  in  a  lengthy  series  of  events 
over  the  last  decade  or  so  that  have  made  it  increas- 
ingly  easy  for  the  public  to  achieve  with  interest- 
bearing  balances  certain  ends  that  previously  required 
non-interest-bearing  demand  balances.  The  latter 
part  of  the  article  summarized  some  of  the  potential 
effects  of  the  amendment  under  given  assumptions. 
On  the  basis  of  the  pricing  policies  announced 
through  mid-October  1978,  it  seems  likely  that  the 
service  will  appeal  primarily  to  depositors  with  large 
checking  balances  who  will  apparently  be  offered 
the  service  without  charge  or  for  a  small  fee  by  many 
of  the  larger  banks.  For  this  reason,  the  analysis  in 
the  preceding  section  suggested  that  ( 1)  the  earnings 
of  a  typical  large  bank  offering  the  service  might  be 
reduced  somewhat  during  the  transition  since  service 
charge  income  might  not  offset  the  increased  interest 
expense  and  (2)  the  potential  improvement  in  the 
efficiency  of  resource  usage  in  the  payments  system 
might  not  be  forthcoming  initially  because  many 
banks  are  not  planning  to  take  advantage  of  the 
introduction  of  the  service  to  reduce  implicit  interest 
payments  significantly.  It  was  also  suggested  that 
the  shifting  of  balances  from  demand  to  savings  ac- 
counts  might  complicate  the  conduct  of  monetary 
policy  in  a  mechanical  way  during  the  transition. 
Despite  these  reservations,  automatic  transfers  will 
probably  be  useful  both  to  banks  and  the  general 
public  as  a  part  of  the  longer  run  transformation  of 
the  nation’s  payments  mechanism  currently  in  prog- 
ress.  Whatever  the  prospects  for  continuation  of  the 
legal  prohibition  of  explicit  interest  on  demand  de- 
12  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1978 posits,  the  force  of  the  prohibition  is  bound  to  be  less  costly  to  transfer  funds  from  one  account  to 
weakened  and  eventually  reduced  to  insignificance  as  another.  Moving  gradually  in  this  direction  through 
continued  development  and  refinement  of  electronic  such  partial  steps  as  automatic  transfers  is  preferable 
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